Las agencias públicas en Españapercepciones sobre autonomía y rendición de cuentas

  1. Ana García-Juanatey 1
  2. Jacint Jordana 1
  3. Salvador Parrado 2
  4. Laura Pascual 3
  5. Miquel Salvador 1
  6. David Sancho 1
  1. 1 Universitat Pompeu Fabra
    info

    Universitat Pompeu Fabra

    Barcelona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04n0g0b29

  2. 2 Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
    info

    Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02msb5n36

  3. 3 Diputación de Barcelona
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Revista:
Revista española de ciencia política

ISSN: 1575-6548

Ano de publicación: 2017

Número: 43

Páxinas: 61-82

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.21308/RECP.43.03 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Outras publicacións en: Revista española de ciencia política

Resumo

This article contributes to our understanding of the autonomy, control and management of public agencies in Spain, based on managers’ perceptions of their financial and operational capacities as well as their mechanisms of accountability. Its findings derive from the opinions of senior officials of Spanish public agencies, gathered through a survey conducted between July and November 2013. The survey is modeled on an international collaborative project (COBRA) that aims to analyze the processes of agencification among public administrations in different countries. The results of this study suggest that managers of Spanish public agencies enjoy a high level of autonomy. The results additionally show that agencies perceived as more autonomous tend to be more accountable towards their respective parent ministries. The study thus conclude that the implementation of the public agency model has not reduced the level of accountability and transparency of public administration in Spain, but, on the contrary, has contributed to encouraging the emergence of a new public manager profile more concerned about the importance of being accountable for its activities.

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet