La interpretación de Emmanuel Levinas de Ideas I de Husserl

  1. López Sáenz, María Carmen
Revista:
Co-herencia: revista de humanidades

ISSN: 1794-5887

Any de publicació: 2018

Volum: 15

Número: 29

Pàgines: 123-152

Tipus: Article

DOI: 10.17230/CO-HERENCIA.15.29.5 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Altres publicacions en: Co-herencia: revista de humanidades

Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible

Resum

This article starts by describing Levinas’ legacy both from Bergson and from Husserl’s phenomenology. Next, it explores how Levinas deeply understood, as early as the 1920s, the meaning of Husserl’s transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913). He adheres to Husserl’s re(con)duction to the transcendental –understood by Levinas as the sense of existence which is overlooked by the naturalist ontology–. The Levinasian interpretation of the controversial ‘reduction’ marked, at an early stage, his differences with Heidegger and his adhesion to the genetic phenomenology, particularly to the horizontal and non-representational intentionality. Finally, the Levinasian continuation of this phenomenology as well as its conclusion, that is, the irreducibility of ethical responsibility, will be analysed.

Referències bibliogràfiques

  • Fenomenología, existencia, intencionalidad, intuición, reducción.