La decisión de voto económico con incertidumbre

Abstract

Since 1966, when Key proposed the reward-punishment rule, the analysis of economic voting has been tuning a theory that explains voter�s decisions as a function of the economic conditions. In this paper we present a model of accountability and economic voting, in which voters are assumed to be risk-neutral and uncertain about the prospective economic situation of the country. Voter�s decision is based upon an additively separable utility function, which has two elements: the prospective sociotropic evaluation and the ideological distance between the voter and the candidates. Voter�s goal consists in choosing a candidate who maximizes the expected utility of his decision. By using a pooled data set from presidential elections that took place in Chile in 1993, 1999-2000 and 2005-2006, we conclude that both the electoral context as well as the leadership are the exogenous factors having the biggest impact over the electoral behavior. We also find that the economic voting of the Chileans is sophisticated, rational and heterogeneous.