Metafísica naturalizadagéneros naturales en consonancia con la práctica científica

  1. Alba Amilburu 1
  2. Cristian Saborido 2
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
    info

    Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

    Lejona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/000xsnr85

  2. 2 Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
    info

    Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02msb5n36

Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2016

Volumen: 35

Número: 2

Páginas: 197-208

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Referencias bibliográficas

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