¿Realmente mató la bacteria al coronel? Perspectiva sistémica, causación internivélica e intervalos de cuasi-descomponibilidad en las explicaciones mecanísticas

  1. Emilio Cáceres Vázquez
  2. Cristian Saborido
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2018

Volumen: 33

Número: 1

Páginas: 129-148

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.18295 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumen

En este trabajo analizamos críticamente el enfoque mecanicista de explicación científica y proponemos complementar esta perspectiva con una concepción de nivel como intervalo de cuasi-descomponibilidad que nos permite fundamentar metafísicamente las propuestas mecanicistas clásicas en las propiedades sistémicas características de las entidades que se trata de explicar. A través del análisis de ejemplos concretos, demostraremos cómo nuestra propuesta permite superar algunas de las limitaciones de los enfoques predominantes de explicación mecanística.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • Alexander, Samuel. 1920. Space, Time, and Deity. Vol 2. London: Mcmillan.
  • Ardila, Gustavo Pradilla, Jaime Otoniel Ayala Pimentel, y Claudia Liliana Sanabria Peña. 2005. Aprendizaje basado en problemas: Tétanos. Salud UIS 37 (3).
  • Barberis, Sergio. 2012. Un análisis crítico de la concepción mecanicista de la explicación. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Vol. XXXVIII (2).
  • Bechtel, William, y Adele Abrahamsen. 2005. Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.
  • Bechtel, William, y Robert C Richardson. 1993. Discovering complexity: Decomposition and localization as scientific research strategies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Cáceres Vázquez, Emilio, y Cristian Saborido. 2017. Intervalos de cuasi-descomponibilidad y propiedades emergentes. Theoria 32 (1):89-108.
  • Cartwright, Nancy. 1994. Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
  • Churchland, Patricia S., y Terrence S. Sejnowski. 1988. Perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. Science 242 (4879):741-745.
  • Craver, Carl F. 2001. Role functions, mechanisms, and hierarchy. Philosophy of science 68 (1):53-74.
  • Craver, Carl F. 2006. When mechanistic models explain. Synthese 153:355-376.
  • Craver, Carl F. 2007. Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
  • Craver, Carl F. 2013. Functions and mechanisms: A perspectivalist view. En Functions: Selection and mechanisms, 133-158. Springer.
  • Craver, Carl F., y William Bechtel. 2006. Top-Down causation without top-down causes. Biology and Philosophy 22:547-63.
  • Dowe, Phil. 2000. Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Dupré, John. 2013. Living Causes. En Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 87:19-37. Wiley Online Library.
  • Fredericks, DN, y David A Relman. 1996. Sequence-based identification of microbial pathogens: a reconsideration of Koch’s postulates. Clinical microbiology reviews 9 (1):18-33.
  • Garson, Justin. 2013. The Functional Sense of Mechanism. Philosophy of science 80 (3):317-333.
  • Gillies, Donald Angus. 2016. Establishing Causality in Medicine and Koch’s Postulates. International Journal of History and Philosophy of Medicine 6: 10603.
  • Glennan, Stuart. 1996. Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation. Erkenntnis 44:49-71.
  • Glennan, Stuart. 2002. Rethinking mechanisms explanation. Philosophy of Science 69:S342-S353.
  • Glennan, Stuart. 2008. Mechanism. En The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, editado por Stathis Psillos y Martin Curd, 376-84. London; New York: Routledge.
  • Gradmann, Christoph. 2014. A spirit of scientific rigour: Koch’s postulates in twentieth-century medicine. Microbes and infection 16 (11):885-892.
  • Hedström, Peter, y Petri Ylikoski. 2010. Causal mechanisms in the social sciences. Annual review of sociology 36:49-67.
  • Hu, Chuan, Mahiuddin Ahmed, Thomas J Melia, Thomas H Söllner, Thomas Mayer, y James E Rothman. 2003. Fusion of cells by flipped SNAREs. Science 300 (5626):1745-1749.
  • Koch, Robert. 1891. Ueber bakteriologische Forschung. En Verhandlung des X Internationalen Medichinischen Congresses, Berlin, 1890. Ed: August Hirschwald, Berlin. pp: 1-35.
  • Kuhlmann, Meinard, y Stuart Glennan. 2014. On the relation between quantum mechanical and neo-mechanistic ontologies and explanatory strategies. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (3):337-359.
  • Latorre, Ramón. 1996. Biofísica y fisiología celular. Ed. Universidad de Sevilla.
  • Levy, Arnon. 2013. Three Kinds of New Mechanism. Biology and Philosophy 28:99-114.
  • Machamer, Peter, Lindley Darden, y Carl F. Craver. 2000. Thinking About Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
  • Michael, Joel, y Sabyasachi Sircar. 2012. Fisiología humana. México: El Manual Moderno.
  • Morgan, C. Lloyd. 1923. Emergent evolution. Editado por Williams y Norgate. 2o edition (1927). London.
  • Oppenheim, Paul, y Hilary Putnam. 1958. Unity of science as a working hypothesis. En Concepts, theories, and the mind-body problem, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II, editado por Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, y Grover Maxwell, 3-36. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  • Penrose, Roger. 1991. La nueva mente del emperador. Barcelona: Grijalbo.
  • Rescher, Nicholas. 1996. Process metaphysics: An introduction to process philosophy. Suny Press.
  • Rood, Julian I., Bruce A. McClane, J. Glenn Songer, y Richard W Titball. 1997. The clostridia: molecular biology and pathogenesis. Academic Press.
  • Salmon, Wesley C. 1994. Causality without counterfactuals. Philosophy of Science, 297-312.
  • Schiavo, G., B. Poulain, O. Rossetto, F. Benfenati, L. Tauc, y C. Montecucco. 1992. Tetanus toxin is a zinc protein and its inhibition of neurotransmitter release and protease activity depend on zinc. The EMBO journal 11 (10):3577.
  • Simon, Herbert A. 1962. The Architecture of Complexity. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106 (6):467-82.
  • Steel, Daniel. 2007. Across the boundaries: Extrapolation in biology and social science. Oxford University Press.
  • Weiss, Paul A. 1969. The living system: determinism stratified. En Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life Sciences, editado por Arthur Koestler y John R. Smythies, 3-55. London, Hutchinson.
  • Wimsatt, William C. 1976. Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem. En Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, editado por Irwin Savodnik (eds.) Walter B. Weimer (auth.) Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, 1.a ed. Springer US.
  • Wimsatt, William C. 1997. Aggregativity: Reductive Heuristics for Finding Emergence. Philosophy of Science 64(2):S372-84.
  • Woodward, James. 2003. Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press.
  • Wright, Cory D. 2012. Mechanistic explanation without the ontic conception. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet