El "Public Sector Purchase Programme" (PSPP) a la luz de las jurisprudencias del TJUE y del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemánantecedentes y consecuencias de la sentencia del BVerfG de 5 de mayo de 2020 (2 BvR 859/15)

  1. Corti Varela, Justo 1
  1. 1 Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
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    Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02msb5n36

Aldizkaria:
Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo

ISSN: 1138-4026

Argitalpen urtea: 2021

Urtea: 25

Zenbakia: 68

Orrialdeak: 67-112

Mota: Artikulua

DOI: 10.18042/CEPC/RDCE.68.03 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Beste argitalpen batzuk: Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo

Laburpena

L’arrêt du 5 mai 2020 de la Cour Constitutionnelle Fédérale Allemande qui déclare ultra vires le Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) de la BCE, et en conséquence aussi l’arrêt Weiss de la CJUE que l’avait validé, constitue un moment critique du dialogue entre les deux tribunaux. Les désaccords comprennent les limites du mandat de la BCE (art. 127 TFUE), en particulier sur comment on doit d’appliquer le principe de proportionnalité aux décisions de politique monétaire, et les critères d’independence et accountability applicables aux mesures avec des effets économiques indirects. Tout ceci a emmené à la Cour Constitutionnelle Allemande à déclarer que l’actuation de l’UE avait surpassé les compétences déléguées d’un façon «structurellement significatif». Avec un oeil sur le Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) elle approuve, avec des objections, les conditionnes imposées sur le PSPP pour accomplir la prohibition de financement monétaire de l’art. 123 TFUE. Etant donné que la décision n’a pas eu des conséquences pratiques directes sur le PSPP, le dommage au principe de primauté ne justifierait pas l’ouverture d’une enquête envisagée un recours en manquement. Cet article analyse la doctrine ultra vires de la Cour Constitutionnelle Allemande (II), l’influence monétariste sur l’architecture de la BCE (III), le control du mandat de la BCE selon la CJUE (IV) et leurs différences avec la Cour Constitutionnelle Allemande (V), l’affectation au principe de primauté (VI) et il conclue avec des réflexions finales sur les conséquences du ce «dialogue» pour améliorer la légitimation démocratique de la politique monétaire.

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