Not all speakers are equalharm and conversational standing

  1. Picazo, Claudia 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía
  1. Pérez Navarro, Eduardo (coord.)
  2. Frápolli Sanz, María José (coord.)

ISSN: 1130-0507,  1989-4651

Any de publicació: 2021

Títol de l'exemplar: Monográfico sobre «Expressing Hatred: The Political Dimension of Expressives»

Número: 84

Pàgines: 81-95

Tipus: Article

DOI: 10.6018/DAIMON.481861 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDIGITUM editor

Altres publicacions en: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

Resum

McGowan has provided a linguistic mechanism that explains how speech can constitute harm. Her idea is that utterances routinely enact s-norms about what is permissible in a given context. My aim is to argue that these s-norms are sensitive to the conversational standing of the speaker. In particular, I claim that the strength of the norm enacted depends on the standing of the speaker. In some cases, the speaker might even lack the standing required to enact new s-norms.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet