Minimal self y las teorías de la identidad personal en fenomenología

  1. Bąk, Agata Joanna 1
  1. 1 Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México
    info

    Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México

    Toluca de Lerdo, México

    ROR https://ror.org/0079gpv38

Revista:
Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía

ISSN: 1576-3935,  1887-505X

Ano de publicación: 2021

Título do exemplar: Sujetos, personas e individuos: estudios sobre la individualidad

Número: 28

Páxinas: 47-60

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.15366/BP2021.28.002 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Outras publicacións en: Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía

Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

Resumo

This paper focuses on the relevance thatthe notion of minimal self, as proposed e.g.by Zahavi, for a phenomenological theory ofidentity. I will do so by analyzing the phenomenonof coming of age. Firstly, I characterizethe notion of minimal self as expressed in Zahavi’sclaims with a view to analyzing premisesand arguments on which it is grounded.Nevertheless, secondly, defending minimalself might pose challenges when it comes tocharacterize certain life experiences that seemto be constituted intersubjectively. In particular,phenomena such as illness, age or genderare not exclusively constituted in individual,solitary experience, but rather they can onlybe ultimately understood by the very subjectin intersubjective perspective. The argument Ioffer in the third step of my exposition, is thedescription of advanced age in terms of personaldiscovery of being old, drawing mainly onSimone de Beauvoir’s writings.

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet