La interpretación de Emmanuel Levinas de Ideas I de Husserl
ISSN: 1794-5887
Year of publication: 2018
Volume: 15
Issue: 29
Pages: 123-152
Type: Article
More publications in: Co-herencia: revista de humanidades
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Abstract
This article starts by describing Levinas’ legacy both from Bergson and from Husserl’s phenomenology. Next, it explores how Levinas deeply understood, as early as the 1920s, the meaning of Husserl’s transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913). He adheres to Husserl’s re(con)duction to the transcendental –understood by Levinas as the sense of existence which is overlooked by the naturalist ontology–. The Levinasian interpretation of the controversial ‘reduction’ marked, at an early stage, his differences with Heidegger and his adhesion to the genetic phenomenology, particularly to the horizontal and non-representational intentionality. Finally, the Levinasian continuation of this phenomenology as well as its conclusion, that is, the irreducibility of ethical responsibility, will be analysed.
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Bibliographic References
- Fenomenología, existencia, intencionalidad, intuición, reducción.