Evaluation of the incentives to participate in the public consultant process of lease project

  1. Mellado Bermejo, Lucía 1
  2. Parte Esteban, Laura 1
  1. 1 Departamento de Economía de la Empresa y Contabilidad. Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
Revista:
Revista de Evaluación de Programas y Políticas Públicas

ISSN: 2340-8464

Año de publicación: 2017

Número: 8

Páginas: 90-117

Tipo: Artículo

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Resumen

El artículo evalúa los factores que incentivan la participación en el proceso de consulta pública del proyecto de contabilidad de arrendamientos. El objetivo es examinar el efecto de las características de cada país en la intensidad de la participación en el proceso de elaboración de normas internacionales de contabilidad. Para ello, llevamos a cabo un estudio empírico utilizando la nueva norma de contabilidad de arrendamientos. En par-ticular, examinamos 1.630 cartas de comentarios recibidas de 46 países diferentes en respuesta al primer documento de discusión (DP 2009) y a los dos borradores de la norma (ED 2010 y 2013). Los resultados sugieren que el marco institucional, el contexto económico, los valores culturales y otras variables sociales de cada país actúan como incentivos para participar a través de cartas comentario en el caso de la norma de conta-bilidad de arrendamientos elaborada conjuntamente por el IASB y el FASB.

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